학술저널
Coase Theorem in Two-sided Matching Marriage Games
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 11 No.3
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1998.09283 - 293 (10 pages)
- 0
커버이미지 없음
This paper demonstrates the Coase Theorem via a two-sided matching framework. We show that in a residual claimer sharing rule economy. regardless of which party gets the right to claim the residual. the equilibrium marital status maximizes the total output and is identical to the optimal marital status in a central planner dictatorial economy.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Democratic Society, Residual Claimer Sharing Rule
Ⅳ. Dictatorial Society and the Coase Theorem
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