학술저널
Private Information and Endogenous Entry
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 16 No.4
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2003.12491 - 500 (9 pages)
- 0
커버이미지 없음
We assume an organization made up of a principal and an agent in which the agent privately observes the state of nature. The agent can use his private information to set up a new firm (endogenous entry) with a positive fixed cost. We show that, in equilibrium, there is effective endogenous entry If the cost of entry the agent must bear to establish a new firm is low enough, as the agent has better information about the state of nature than the principal.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Results
Ⅳ. Competition in the Product Market
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References
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