학술저널
Observation of Common Retail Cost under Exclusive Dealing
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 18 No.1
-
2005.031 - 19 (18 pages)
- 2
커버이미지 없음
This paper examines whether the manufacturer should observe the common retail cost when exclusively delegating a retailer to sell her goods. We show that the expected sum of profits between the manufacturer and retailer is greater when the former does not observe the cost ex ante than when they do. However, the manufacturer cannot acquire a greater expected private payoff when not observing the cost, regardless of the optimal contract. Even if the commitment to not observe the cost alleviates competition, the manufacturer must always pay higher information rent than the increasing payoff to the retailer.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Model
Ⅲ. Derivation of Output and Sales Profit in Equilibrium
Ⅳ. Concluding Remarks
References
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