제5장 기업집단의 피라미드 소유지배구조와 경영성과의 관계

An Empirical Study on Pyramid Control Structure and Performance of the Korean Business Groups

이 논문은 우리나라 대규모 기업집단의 사업구조, 재무구조, 피라미드 소유지배구조의 대리변수들이 그룹 차원의 경영성과에 미친 영향을 실증분석하고 있다. 대규모 기업집단은 우리나라 경제의 압축성장에 상당한 기여를 해왔으나 1997년 외환위기를 전후하여 30대 기업집단 중 약 절반이 부실화되면서 재벌구조의 비효율성이 집중적으로 거론되고 개혁의 주된 대상으로 몰리고 있다. 그러나 아쉽게도 재벌에 대한 비판과 이에 기초한 신설규제들은 체계적인 통계분석이 선행되지 않은 상황에서 진행되었으며, 본 논문의 분석결과는 재벌구조와 경영성과의 관계에 대한 '구태의연한 상식'은 오히려 사실과 다를 수 있음을 시사한다. 예를 들면, 문어발식 사업다각화가 그룹 차원의 경영성과에 비효율을 초래할 것이라는 일반적인 가설은 통계적으로 뒷받침되지 않으며, 기업집단의 내부지분율은 적어도 외환위기 이전까지는 경영성과에 긍정적인 영향을 준 것으로 나타난다. 그리고 최근에 논란을 빚고 있는 의결권 승수와 관련해서는 이의 대리지표인 피라미드 지배승수를 이용하여 경영성과에 미친 영향을 분석한 결과, 1989~1996년의 장기분석에서 "지배주주의 피라미드 레버리지가 증가하면 경영성과는 악화된다"는 가설은 부인되며, 지배승수와 경영성과는 오히려 통계적으로 유의한 양(+)의 관계를 맺고 있는 것으로 나타난다.

This paper aims at empirically examining the effect of various features of chaebol structure on the group level performance. For more than four decades, chaebols, largely diversified business groups in Korea, have contributed to the rapid growth of domestic economy. But they have faced the difficulty from the mid-1990s, and the half of the top 30 chaebols went into bankruptcy or debt restructuring program around the time of financial crisis in the late 1997. What then went wrong with the chaebols? Which of their structure and/or strategies made them fragile at the shock of financial crisis? Among various features of the chaebols, we focus on the pyramid ownership and control structure, business scope, and debt structure to investigate how they affected the group level performance during the period 1989-1996. In our regression model, ROA, ROS, and other profit measures are employed alternatively, and independent variables include the debt-asset ratio(DEBT), the Entropy diversification index(DT), pyramid control leverage(PYRAMID), and in-group shareholding (INSIDE) with some control variables. When we estimate the above model, we find four interesting points about the chaebol structure and performance. First, the estimated coefficient of DEBT has a negative sign with strong statistical significance. Thus we may say that the high debt ratios in the chaebols have been the main driving force to reduce the profit rate of each group on the average. Second, the diversification variables have negative signs but they are not statistically insignificant. While it is true that a typical chaebols are largely diversified into 20 industries, the over-diversification hypothesis is not well accepted in our sample. This result may indicate that the chaebols' extensive business scope does not prove that they have pursued an excessive diversification. However one caution should be taken because Hwang(1999), using the sample of nine bankrupt chaebols, show that the diversification level has a negative effect on the profit rate during the period 1985-1996. Third, the variable INSIDE has a positive coefficient with statistical significance. This finding here is quite interesting because more than 90% of the in-group shareholding consists of cross-equity investment among affiliates, and previous literature predicts the negative effect of cross ownership on performance. For example, Bebchuck-Kraakman-Triantis(1999) and Kim(2001) explain that cross ownership, other things being equal, strengthens the management entrenchment for the minority controlling shareholder and thus leads to performance worsening. Along with this context, the regulatory authority in Korea has maintained the hostile approach to the in-group shareholding. Bur the finding here indicate that the in-group shareholding has a beneficial effect on chaebols' performance at least before the economic crisis in Korea. Finally, it is most surprising that the pyramid control structure in chaebols positively affected the group level of performance during the period 1989-1996. The estimated coefficient of PYRAMID variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant. Thus we may say that the minority controlling structure in the chaebols has not been always the factor to lower the profit rate. This result is quite contrasting with the predictions based on the agency theory. For example, BKT(1999) and Morck-Strangeland-Yeung(1998) claim that in business groups like Korean chaebols, the pyramid control structure facilitates entrepreneurs to effectively control assets of all the affiliates with their own small investment, and thus worsen the management entrenchment and agency problems. While they may predict some negative relation between pyramid multiplier and profit rate, however, our finding here suggest that their hypotheses can not be supported in the Korean experiences. We also find that there exists the reversed U-shape relation between pyramid leverage and profit.