독일법상 이사의 책임과 임원배상책임보험에 관한 연구

Research on Responsibility of Directors and D&O Liability Insurance under German Law

독일에서는 임원배상책임보험에 '배상청구기준'이 원칙적으로 적용된다. 이 배상청구기준에 의하면 보험에 의한 전보를 받기 위해서는 보험기간 중에 배상청구가 있어야 한다. 그러나 독일에서는 보험기간 경과 후에도 보험금 지급을 받을 수 있도록 추가고지기간을 허용하고 있다. 이사보수의 적정성과 관련하여 새로 개정된 독일 주식법 제93조 제2항 제3문에 의하여 주식회사는 임원을 위하여 임원배상책임보험계약을 체결할 때 자기부담금을 약정할 의무가 있다. 이러한 자기부담금이 있다면 이사는 자신의 개인재산으로 배상책임을 진다고하는 압박을 받게 되고 이사는 임무위반을 하지 않으려고 최대한 노력을 기울일 것이다. 그러나 배상책임으로 인하여 임원 개인의 파산을가져올 수 있고 이러한 두려움이 임원의 결단력 있고 과감한 업무집행을 방해할 수 있기 때문에 자기부담금의 상한액을 정하는 것이 권장되고 있다. 독일 기업들의 임원들은 장래의 위험에 대비하여 자기부담금을 부보하는 보험에 사적으로 가입할 수 있다. 이 자기부담금보험은 독일에서 실제로 많이 이용되어 왔다. 그러나 손해배상금을 회사가 떠안거나 이사의 보수를 더 올려주면서 이사가 부담한 손해 배상을 보전해 준다면 의무적인 자기부담금제도의 실효성에 문제가 생길 수도 있다. 우리나라에서도 임원배상책임보험이 기업 임원들의 도덕적 해이를 초래할 수도 있기 때문에 이를 방지하기 위해서는 독일에서처럼 자기부담금제도를 활용할 필요가 있다. 임원배상책임보험의 체결을 통하여 배상책임의 위험성이 감소했다 하더라도 손해배상액이 배상책임보험금을 상회한다면 임원은 추가적인 배상책임을 지게 되는 위험은 계속 남게 된다. 그래서 독일에서처럼 준법감시기구의 설치와 실질적인 운영을 통하여 임원의 책임 발생을 사전에 예방하는 것이 무엇보다도 중요하다고 생각한다.

The corporation system of South Korea is based on the principle of separating ownership and management, thus, concentrates the rights of corporate operations to the board of directors and directors. Since the IMF Crisis, criticism has increased towards the poor management by executives of corporations that have enormous power, which has led to the movement of strengthening the responsibilities of these executives and actively inquiring into their legal responsibilities. Although the strict inquiry into their responsibilities may help to restrain unlawful or unfair acts by executives, such may also lead to shriveled management, which may restrict creative and dynamic activities. Thus, as a measure of alleviating the responsibility of directors, South Korea and Germany have enacted a system of exempting directors from liability for damage compensation through considering the systematic relationship between directors and the company. However, such system is exhibiting low effectiveness in practice because the threshold to reach in order to obtain exemption is extremely high. In order to resolve this problem, South Korea sought to alleviate the responsibility of directors by applying a business judgment rule, however, unlike the United States or Germany, such rule has not been codified yet, hence, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding the application of the business judgment rule. As a result, there is a need to consider systematic improvement and vitalization of liability insurance of corporate officers and executives, which is showing increased rates of subscription, in order to alleviate the liability of directors. The contents that have implications for South Korea among the discussions relating to corporate officer liability insurance in Germany are summarized as follows. Corporate officer liability insurance is provided for defense against claims for damage compensation (legal protection role) and for exemption of directors for damage compensation obligations (responsibility role). In addition, corporate officer liability insurance has the effect of a monitoring capacity. In liability insurance, accidents giving rise to damage compensation claims (liability accident based method) may be regarded as the basis for insurance or damage compensation claims themselves (compensation claim based method) may be regarded as the basis for insurance accidents. In Germany, the compensation claim based method is used in principle for corporate officer liability insurance. Based on the compensation claim based method, in order to receive insurance payments, there must be a damage compensation claim during the insurance period. However, in Germany, additional notification periods are permitted to allow receipt of insurance payments even after expiration of the insurance period. Based on Article 93, Clause 2, Section 3 of the newly revised Stock Act of Germany that relates to the propriety of the remuneration for directors, a corporation has the obligation to agree on self-pay costs when subscribing to corporate officer liability insurance agreements for officers. When having to pay self-pay costs, directors will be put under the pressure of having to compensate for damages with their own personal assets, and directors will have to make their best efforts to avoid breaching their duties. However, the responsibility to compensate for damages may cause the bankruptcy of an individual officer, and because such fears may add distract and impair the officer's ability to make clear decisions while performing duties, it would be advisable to establish an upper limit of the self-pay costs. Officers of German corporations may personally subscribe to insurance that cover self-pay costs in order to prepare for future risks. The insurance for self-pay costs have actually been widely used in Germany. However, there may be an issue in the effectiveness of an obligatory self-insurance system if companies take charge of the damage