수직 구조, 전략적 무역정책과 수출기업의 의사결정

Vertical Structure, Strategic Trade Policy, Exporting Firm s First-mover and Second-mover Advantages

In scrutinizing strategic export policies, we consider the issue of first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the monopolistic upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firm export to a third-country market. Compared to the result in the strategic trade literature without a vertical structure(e. g. Brander and Spencer; 1985, Eaton and Grossman; 1986), we find that the upstream firms and their governments preference orders over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies are reversed in a vertical structure. This is because the monopolistic upstream firm controls first- and second-mover advantages by adjusting input prices under free trade, while anticipating this upstream firm s input price setting, governments impose subsidies and taxes under either Cournot or Bertrand competition mode.