사회적 정당성과 경영권 방어 : 한국 대규모 기업집단의 기업공개 비율 결정요인

Social Legitimacy and the Management Rights Defense : Determinants of the Public Offering Ratio of Korean Business Groups

본 연구는, 한국의 대규모 기업집단들 간에 계열사 기업공개 비율이 상이하다는 경험적 현상에 근거하여, 이에 영향을 미치는 요인들을 사회적 정당성의 획득과 경영권 방어 장치 확보라는 상반된 이해관계 하에서의 의사결정이라는 관점에서 바라보고자 하였다. 이러한 관점을 바탕으로, 기업공개라는 제도적 압력 하에서 기업집단들은 경영권 방어 기제 구축이 이해관계자들에게 어떻게 인식되는지에 따라 계열사 기업공개 비율의 증가 라는 사회적 정당성 획득을 위한 행위에 다르게 대처할 것이라는 논의에 기반하여 연구가설을 도출하였다. 구체적으로, 총수 및 가족지분을 통한 직접통제와 계열사를 통한 간접통제의 차이에 주목하여, 간접통제의 수준이 높을 경우 소유구조에 대한 정당성 압력이라는 측면에서의 부담감을 야기하여 기업집단들은 사회적 정당성 확보를 위해 계열사에 대한 기업공개비율을 높이는데 보다 적극적일 수도 있다는 가설을 제시하였다. 반면, 직접통제 수준이 높을 경우 정당성 압력으로부터 상대적 자율성을 확보하고 있는 상태라는 점에서, 통제권 확보에 따른 자기이익추구 행위가 용이한 방향으로 심리적 기제가 발현될 가능성이 있으며, 이는 낮은 수준의 기업공개비율로 나타날 수도 있을 것이라는 가설을 제시하였다. 한편, 본 연구의 이론적 논의를 경험적으로 뒷받침하기 위해 2002년부터 2010년까지의 기간 동안 상호출자제한 대상으로 연속 3회 이상 지정된 적이 있는 기업집단들을 대상으로 실증분석을 수행하였다. 기업집단에 속한 전체 계열사 중에서 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥에 상장된 계열사의 비율을 종속변수로 한 토빗 회귀분석 결과, 계열사 지분율과 자사 지분율로 대표되는 간접 지분통제 수준과 기업공개비율 사이에서는 통계적으로 유의미한 결과를 찾을 수 없었지만, 총수 지분율과 가족 지분율로 대표되는 직접 지분통제 수준이 높을 경우에는 기업공개 비율에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 밝혀졌다.

This study investigates whether the ownership structure of Korean business groups affects the public offering ratio of their subsidiaries. The increase in the public offering ratio of these subsidiaries became a norm in Korean corporate governance only after the 1997 economic crisis, a crisis which provided the impetus to reflect upon corporate governance problems that had previously not been considered problematic due to Korea’s rapid growth. In this situation, the increase in the public offering ratio of business group subsidiaries was considered a signifier of improvement in the corporate governance system. A corporation is not an atomic actor separated from its environment, but an actor embedded in it, and as such faces a variety of external audiences. The environment surrounding a firm may determine its success or failure, but the corporation also interacts with its environment to increase the probability of its survival. However, even when following desired norms, firms do not always seek the best solutions and of ten do not rely on rational processes. Firms may increase the public offering ratio of subsidiaries to court publicity or to follow the prevailing trend. What’s more, when there is the shared belief that an increase in the public offering ratios of subsidiaries is useful for monitoring management and securing external resources, and thus an essential institutionalized business management practice, even those firms that do not want to open their subsidiaries to the public will do so. In other words, the increase in the public offering ratio of business group subsidiaries may be forced upon individual firms as nothing more than a business norm, rather than useful business practice. Firms that face a loss of legitimacy tend to try to recover it by introducing systems or practices that are recognized as socially reasonable and justifiable. This behavior can be interpreted as a part of the process of submitting to external pressure and meeting the expectations of the audience. However, the risk of the management rights defense may arise when the public offering ratio of business group subsidiaries is increased. In this article, we suggest testable research hypotheses under the view that the public offering ratio of Korean business groups is the result of resolving the trade-off between social legitimacy and the management rights defense. We divide Korean business groups’ governance mechanisms into two broad categories: relationships among subsidiaries (i.e., cross shareholding and internal equity ratio) and the ratio of owner and family ownership. The study then derives the following hypotheses. H1: The stronger the level of indirect control, the higher the public offering ratio of subsidiaries. H1a: The stronger the cross-shareholding among subsidiaries, the higher the public offering ratio of the subsidiaries. H1b: The higher the internal equity ratio, the higher the public offering ratio of subsidiaries. H2: The stronger the level of direct control, the lower the public offering ratio of subsidiaries. H2a: The more stock that is held by the ownermanager of a certain business group, the lower the public offering ratio of its subsidiaries. H2b: The more stock that is held by the family of the owner-manager ofa certain business group, the lower the public offering ratio of its subsidiaries. Hypothesis testing was performed using a sample consisting of those business groups listed in the annual report of the Korea Fair Trade Commission for three straight years during the observation period 2002~2010. The statistical results of Tobit regression partially supported our arguments. No statistically significant effect was observed for cross-shareholding among subsidiaries and internal equity ratio. A statistically significant negative effect was observed for owner-manager stockholding and ownermanager’s family stockholding.