독일법상의 소수주주 강제축출제도에 관한 연구

Study on Squeeze-out System under German Law

지배주주는 소수주주의 주식을 강제로 매수할 수 있게 하고 소수주주는 지배주주에 대하여 그 보유주식의 매수를 청구할 수 있도록 하는 상법 개정이 2011년에 이루어졌다. 이와 같은 상법개정의 이유는 "특정주주가 주식의 대부분을 보유하는 경우 회사로서는 주주총회 운영 등과 관련하여 관리비용이 들고 소수주주로서는 정상적인 출자회수의 길이 막히기 때문에 대주주가 소수주주의 주식을 매입함으로써 그 동업관계의 해소를 허용하기 위함"이라고 한다. 그러나 이러한 장점에도 불구하고 "주주의 의사와 관계없이 주식을 팔아야 하기 때문에 재산권 침해의 가능성이 크다는 점"을 근거로 하여 헌법소원의 제기도 거론되고 있다. 그리고 "상법 제360조의24 제1항에서 규정한 "경영상 목적을 달성하기 위하여 필요한 경우"라는 단서 조항이 애매해 대주주 측이 남용할 가능성이 있다는 점"도 지적되었다. 이처럼 소수주식의 전부취득제도로 인한 소수주주의 억압과 강제 축출은 소수주주에게 불이익을 야기할 수 있기 때문에 동 제도가 남용되지 않고 소수주주를 보호할 수 있는 제도적 보완이 필요하다. 즉 지배주주는 우월적 지위를 이용하여 부당한 가격으로 소수주주를 축출할 수도 있는데 소수주주의 권리보호를 위해서는 소수주식의 매매가액이 공정하게 책정되어야 한다. 우리나라도 독일의 경우처럼 매매가액의 적정성평가는 법원이 선임한 전문검사인에 의하여 이루어지도록 하여야 한다.

A court of the United States ("U.S.") approved of the legality of cash-out merger that allows a controlling shareholder to forcibly exclude minority shareholders, who oppose a merger, from the company from the 1970s. The system for compulsory purchase of minority shares, which originates from the U.S. law, is being adopted by most of the European countries, including Germany, and furthermore, is being spread globally. The systems for compulsory purchase of minority shares of each nation show a slight difference regarding the contents, such as the ratio of owned shares or company qualified to apply. The Commercial Code of Korea, which was revised in 2011 based on the legislation of the U.S. and Germany, newly established a system for total acquisition of minority shares, which allows a controlling shareholder to forcibly purchase the shares of minority shareholders in the event that the controlling shareholder owns 95% or more of the outstanding shares and allows minority shareholders to claim to controlling shareholders to purchase the shares they own. The reason such revision was made in the Commercial Code was "to allow to resolve the partnership relationship by the purchase of the shares of minority shareholders by the majority shareholders, because the company must spend managerial expenses relating to operating the general shareholders' meeting and minority shareholders would be prevented from normally gathering their investment, in the event a particular shareholder owns most of the shares." However, despite such advantage, the issue of bringing a constitutional appeal is being raised based on the fact that "there is a huge possibility of infringing the property rights because the shares must be sold irrelevant of the intent of the shareholders." In addition, the fact that "there is a possibility that the majority shareholders may abuse the system" was pointed out, because the conditional provision stating that, 'in the event it is necessary to achieve a management objective,' as regulated in Article 360-24 Clause 1 of the Commercial Code,' is ambiguous. The suppression over minority shareholders and compulsory exclusion due to the system for total acquisition of minority shares may incur disadvantage to the minority shareholders, and accordingly, a systematical supplementation allowing to protect the minority shareholders while preventing the abuse of the system would be needed. In other words, a controlling shareholder may exclude a minority shareholder based on an unreasonable price by using a superior status, and therefore, the sales value of minority shares must be arranged in a fair manner to protect the rights of minority shareholders. Korea may want to consider conducting a propriety evaluation of the sales value through an expert examiner appointed by the court, as in Germany.