On the Interaction between Player Heterogeneity and Partner Heterogeneity in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.26 No.3
-
2015.0915 - 34 (20 pages)
- 8
This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and ex-clusive partner heterogeneity assumption studied by Galeotti et al. (2006) and Billand et al. (2011) respectively. We provide a proposition that gen-eralizes the results of these models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network consists of multiple non-empty components as in Galeotti et al. (2006), and (ii) each non-empty component is a branching or B i network as in Billand et al. (2011). This proposition requires that a restriction on link formation cost, which is called Uniform Partner Ranking, is satisfied.
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MODEL
3. USEFUL LEMMAS
4. MAIN RESULTS - EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
(0)
(0)