국제 기업 간 R&D 투자 협력하에서 관세정책

A Study on the Tariff Policy under International Cooperation in R&D Investment with Spillovers

The importance of international R&D spillovers has long been recognized, although estimates of their empirical significance at the macroeconomic level were often elusive. In this paper, we analyze the relation between R&D spillovers and trade-related variables, using an international oligopoly model where firms act cooperatively in R&D investment, but were not collaborative in terms of output. We show for both free trade and protection cases that there exists a unique symmetric solution (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). As the solution, while analytical, cannot be stated in close form, we resorted to numerical examples to investigate the patterns of equilibrium results. Our theoretical prediction indicates for both free trade and protection cases that the level of R&D investment and the rate of R&D expenditure increase as the degree of R&D spillovers increases. We also trace the (graphic) relationship between the degree of R&D spillovers and tariff level. Our finding indicates that the optimal tariff curve is U-shaped. This is an important implication because it implies that when firms cooperate via international R&D investment, a country’s optimal tariff has to vary according to the degree of R&D spillovers.