국가예산과정에서의 도덕적 해이(Moral Hazard)에 관한 연구

A Study of Moral Hazard in the Process of Budgeting

Moral hazard is the main theme of principal-agent model in economics of organization. It refers to the lack of effort on the part of the agent. On other word, the egent is shirking. In the situation where the principal cannot observe the agent's action or preference in full detail there will be asymmetric information between principal and agent. The asymmetric information will induce the agent problen: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard arises from the unobservability of actual behavior in the ex-post contracting situation. To approach moral hazard rather than corruption is to prevent it in advance. Moral hazard could be occured in public sector more often, especially in the process of budgeting because of the political process and the interests of politicians. Moral hazard in budgeting process can be reduced through the open information system and participation of civil society in the process. Moral hazard could corrupt our society with the bribery and illegal abuse of power for self-interests.