내포와 믿음문장

Intension and Belief-Sentence

The purpose of this paper is to treat formally the two of the four problems which Belief-sentences may create: one is the problem of substitution and the other the problem of ambiguous readings. For that purpose, the writer makes the best use of the intension which Formal Semanticists have already established. The concept of the intension used is as follows: 1) The intension of a name as a function from indices to individuals. 2) The intension of a predicate as a function that gives the set denoted at that index. 3) The intension of a formula as a function from indices to truth values. By means of this intension, Belief-sentences are treated formally and adequately. There are two findings that we can have: One of the two is the fact that we cannot substitute one name for another in Belief-sentence if their intensions are different. Another is the fact that if a non-rigid designator in Belief-sentences is within the intensional operator, it is possible for us to have a de dict reading.