학술대회자료
Bidding with Securities: Comment
Bidding with Securities: Comment
- 한국계량경제학회
- 한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집
- 2008년 하계학술대회
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2008.081 - 14 (14 pages)
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Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005, henceforth DKS) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS’s by assuming that a higher return requires a higher investment cost. Given this latter assumption, steeper securities are more vulnerable to adverse selection, and may yield lower expected revenue, than flatter ones.
1 Model
2 Ranking Security Designs
3 Ranking Auction Formats
4 Concluding Remarks
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