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트럼프 집권 이후의 동북아와 한·미·일 관계

Northeast Asia and the Korea-U.S-Japan Relations after Inauguration of President Trump

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This paper explains the internal and external influences of the nuclear development policy which is the national security strategy of the Kim Jung Eun regime in North Korea, by comparing it with the soviet nuclear buildup policy in the Khrushchev era. The national security strategy of the Kim Jung Eun regime is characterized by the policy of nuclear force building in the dual policy of nuclear and economic development which was proclaimed in March 2013 by the Central Committee of the Worker s Party of Korea. If classification of the nuclear strategies of socialist states as the nuclear deterrence strategy of China and the nuclear buildup strategy of the Soviet Union is possible, the contents of the North Korea s nuclear force building policy can be modeled on the revolutionary arguments of nuclear buildup policy in the Khrushchev era. The soviet nuclear buildup policy of the Khrushchev era has permitted domestic attempts to increase investment in the consumer goods sector such as light industry and agriculture and to reduce dependence on conventional military forces. However, The Soviet nuclear blackmail based on their nuclear buildup process externally caused western distrust on the Soviet detente policy, expansion of US nuclear and conventional military capabilities, and additional investment in interceptor missile systems. Today, the influences of North Korea s nuclear buildup policy is similar to that seen in the Soviet Union in the past, and it involves internal emphasis on the light industry and agriculture. It interferes with the improvement of inter-Korean relations and causes strengthened defense measures of the ROK-US alliance. There is also some differences between the effects of Kim Jung Eun s nuclear force building policy and the impact of Khrushchev s nuclear buildup policy. Compared with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, the reduction of military expenditure in North Korea is not clearly visible, and difficulties in managing allies are evident.

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 트럼프의 국제관

Ⅲ. 동북아 국제관계 전망

Ⅳ. 한·미·일 관계와 한국의 대응책

Ⅴ. 결론

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