계속기업의견이 감사인 교체에 미치는 영향

The Effect of the Going-concern Opinion on Auditor Change

본 연구는 계속기업 관련 변형된 의견(이하 ‘계속기업의견’)이 감사인 교체에 미치는 영향을 분석하는데 목적이 있다. 계속기업의견이 발표된 이후 해당 의견은 피감사기업이 도산하는데 원인으로서 영향을 미칠 수도 있기 때문에 피감사기업 입장에서 계속기업의견은 다른 비적정의견보다 회피하고자 하는 성향이 강한 의견이다. 따라서 피감사기업은 감사인이 계속기업의견을 표명하지 못하도록 하기 위해 감사인 교체압력을 가할 가능성이 존재한다. 계속기업의견의 표명 시 감사계약이 해지될 수도 있다는 점은 감사인이 계속기업의견의 표명을 회피하게 하는 요인이 된다. 뿐만 아니라, 계속기업의견의 표명이 피감사기업의 도산에 원인으로 작용할 수 있다는 점은 감사인 입장에서도 큰 부담으로 작용한다. 그러므로 계속기업 관련 불확실성이 존재할 때 감사인은 변형의견 대신에 강조사항을 포함한 적정의견을 표명함으로써 감사인 교체압력에서 벗어날 수 있을 것이다. 따라서 계속기업의견을 표명할 때와 계속기업 강조사항을 포함한 적정의견을 표명할 때 감사인 교체율이 다르게 나타나는 지를 실증 분석하였다. 2001년부터 2011년까지 기간 동안의 상장기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 계속기업 강조사항을 포함한 의견을 표명했을 때 강조사항이 없는 적정의견보다는 감사인 교체율이 높지만, 계속기업 변형의견 보다는 감사인 교체율이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 감사인이 교체가능성을 고려하여 계속기업의견 표명을 주저할 가능성의 존재에 대한 실증적 증거를 제시하고 있다. 이러한 분석을 통해 실제로 감사인이 계속기업의견의 표명을 피해 적정의견과 변형의견 사이에서 책임을 면피하는 수단으로 강조사항의 기재라는 선택을 할 가능성이 있다는 것을 확인할 수 있다. 또한 본 연구는 감사인 유지제도 하에서도 여전히 감사인의 독립성을 훼손시키는 교체압력이 존재하고 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 이는 관련 규제기관에게 감사인 교체압력으로부터 감사인의 독립성을 확보하기 위한 제도적인 체제 마련이 필요하다는 정책적 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다.

Client selects the auditor based on the market mechanism since 1982 in korea. This system has the advantage that the audit quality is improved by auditor’s competition. However, since clients have the right to choice auditor in this system, there is the asymmetry of power between auditors and clients, which may seriously weaken the auditor’s ability to exercise his professional judgment independently. Firms wish to avoid non-unqualified opinion because it may adversely affect the market price of the firm’s stock and the credit rate. Therefore, when auditors try to issue non-unqualified opinion, firm may use auditor switches to pressure auditors into issuing unqualified opinion. These pressures are threatening the independence of the auditor. Many prior studies have raised that the pressure on auditors to switch is one of the reasons why the auditor is unable to maintain independence. Non-unqualified opinion is issued in the presence of 1) the limit of the scope of audit, 2) the disagreement between auditor and manager, and 3) the material uncertainty. In particular, the going-concern opinion is considered when one of the most significant uncertainties arises, that is, when there are doubts about the continued existence of an entity. Comparing other modified opinion has a impact on the firm’s value, the going-concern opinion affects not only the intrinsic value but also the continuity of the firm. Once the going-concern opinion is announced, there is a possibility that the opinion result in the bankruptcy of the firm (this is referred to “self-fulfilling prophecy”). Therefore, as issuance of going-concern opinion serves to announce officially that the firm may go bankrupt within a year, managers want to avoid going-concern modified opinion more than other non-unqualified opinion. In addition, a going-concern opinion is very likely to be a subjective judgment of the auditors compared to other modified opinion caused by the disagreement between managers and auditors or the limit of audit scope. The subjectivity of going-concern opinion raises the probability that auditor arbitrarily adjust the audit opinion. Auditor could include the explanatory paragraph on going-concern uncertainty instead of issuing non-unqualified opinion, thereby maintain the relationship with the client. This paper examines the influence of the type of prior audit opinion on auditor switches. Specifically, this study focuses on going-concern modified opinion. The study is conducted on the listed companies from 2001 to 2011. We divide the sample into three groups; firms received unqualified opinion without explanatory paragraph on going-concern uncertainty, firms received unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph and going-concern modified opinion and investigate whether the type of going concern opinion affects the likelihood of auditor switch. Our results of analysis are as follows. First, firms received non-unqualified opinion including explanatory paragraph on going-concern uncertainty in previous year are more likely to change auditors than firms received unqualified opinion without explanatory paragraph. Second, firms received going-concern modified opinion in previous year are more likely to change auditors than firms received unqualified opinion including explanatory paragraph on going-concern uncertainty. Lastly, considering that the incentive for auditor switch depends on the possibility of bankruptcy, we omit bankrupt firm from the sample and get the same results. This study adds to the extant literature on the effect of audit opinion on auditor change by separating the groups by the type of going-concern opinion. Our empirical findings provide meaningful implications to practitioners and academic researchers who interested in the association between audit opinion and auditor change.