Keeping Instability at Bay:

Can China be relied upon 10 pressure North Kocea 10 give up nudear weapons and weapons-related technology, and 10 preven North Korea from cheating On any agreemenl 10 do 50? We argue that China‘s post-Deng !eaders are more ∞næmed with domestic political legitimacy and intra-regime rivalries than their predecessors. Therefore, we expect thcir priorities 10 be avoiding a second Korean War and preventing the ∞lI apse of the North Korean regime 까le North Korean nudear capabiliη and its geitical equenα， by nast， do not appear pose serious threats. China s bel avior toward the North before and during the Six-Party Ta1ks is consistent with this reasoning China seems ∞ncemed to prevent an economic collapse of the North Korean regime, and to prevent North Korea from miscalculating and acting in a way that will lead to a second Korean War. But, at the same time, China does not seem willing to make the kînds of credible threats that would force the North denuclearize