Determinants of Union Density under Democratization: South Korean Industrial-Level Evidence

The purpose of this paper is to argue that democratic consolidation in South Korea made a qualitative change in state-civil society relations, but did not cause a shift in industrial relations between labor and capital within civil society. I locate my arguments within the long-standing debate on the determinants of union density between Wallerstein (1989) and Stephens and Wallerstein (1991)and test the competing hypotheses drawn from each work using the statistical analysis of the unique South Korean industrial-level data from two distinct democratization periods (democratization and democratic consolidation). I find that Stephens’ “industrial structure” model does not sustain the empirical tests for both periods. In contrast, Wallerstein’s bargaining model on union density withstands the statistical test only for the democratic consolidation period. I show that the case studies of two presidential terms complement the foibles of each of theories and foster the aforementioned argument.