A New Approach to a Territorial Dispute Involving a Former Colonizer-Colony Pair: The Case of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute between Korea and Japan

Given that most states in the international system were once ruled as colonies or other dependencies of at least one foreign power, many scholars have examined the ongoing repercussions of colonialism. We study one such topic, that of territorial dispute between a former colony and its former colonial ruler. Specifically, we look at one such pair, Korea and Japan, and at the territorially disputed islets of Dokdo/Takeshima. Hitherto, policymakers and scholars alike have emphasized the importance of history and international law in this dispute. In this paper, we argue that plausible historical and legal arguments are not adequate tools to explain the current deadlock or predict the future outcome of the dispute, an important element of social-science research. In this paper, we see the territorial dispute as a strategic issue based on the utilities/preferences of the citizenry in the disputant nations. With that in mind, we introduce two different types of utilities possessed by Korea and Japan in relation to Dokdo/Takeshima and show how the disputed islets can be valued differently depending upon the weights of these two types of utilities. Utilizing two utility functions and a bargaining model, we predict the most likely outcome of the dispute, which is (very close to) the status quo. Given the current relative importance of the two utilities in Korea and Japan, any kind of negotiated settlement between the two countries is unlikely. Successful bargaining on the issue of the islets will only be possible when the preferences of the citizens of these countries undergo a fundamental change regarding what is and is not considered important. We conclude by discussing some scenarios in which the preferences of Korea and/or Japan over the disputed islets may change.