불확실성과 선도자가 있는 국제 시장에서 공정 연구개발 정책

R&D Subsidy and Tax Policy with or without International Market Leaders Amidst Uncertainty

This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of R&D subsidy or tax from international markets without a leader and with one in an uncertain world. Governments in each of the two countries simultaneously select R&D subsidy or tax in an attempt to shift profits in favor of domestic, imperfectly competitive firms. It is shown that: (i) the optimal level of R&D subsidy or tax with a leading firm is zero for all the degree of differentiation between goods. The optimal policy with a following firm is the imposition of an R&D tax when the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and an R&D subsidy when the goods are sufficiently differentiated; (ii) the government with a leading firm in the international market provides higher R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader. The government with a following firm in the international market provides lower R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated, and vice versa, if the goods are sufficiently differentiated; and (iii) expected welfare for the country with a leading firm can be lower than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively great. Expected welfare for the country with a following firm can be greater than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively small. Furthermore, this finding holds for the more differentiated goods with uncertainty.