학술저널
Optimal Contracts for Risk Managers
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 31 No.1
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2018.0299 - 120 (22 pages)
- 7
This study analyzed the principal-agent problem, in which the agent performs risk management tasks, and considered the cost minimization problem of the principal, the objective of which is to design the cheapest contract inducing a target effort. Our results confirm that a one-step bonus contract should be used, which means that a bonus contract is most efficient for the principal in terms of incentive provision. A new condition to justify the first-order approach in our model was also provided.
I. Introduction
II. Basic Model
III. Analysis
IV. Justifying the First-Order Approach
V. Conclusion
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