해양생물자원의 공유 비극 현상과 극복 방안

The Tragedy of the Commons of Marine Living Resources and its Treatment Policy

This paper aims to provide a simple economic model suitable for explaining why the tragedy of the commons take place in marine living resources and for seeking how to deal with the tragedy. This economic model suggested that because of the two traits-excludability and rivalry-marine living resources has, socially optimal catch which maximizes the whole gain of participants is always less than open access catch derived from free competition between them. The discrepancy between two catches makes the stock of marine living resources fail to keep consistent and people fail to capture them sustainably. In the long run, marine living resources get extinct, which is the tragedy of the commons. This model also shows that the higher the market price of marine living resources, the more advanced technology for catching, the higher the expected price of marine living resources and the higher time preference, compared with interest rate, the faster the tragedy of the commons happens. The basic rule for policy to prevent the tragedy is to design policy so that open access catch may dovetail with social optimal catch. These policies just like total allowance catch, vessel catch limits, the issues of licences and imposition of landing fees are suggested and their effectiveness are analyzed, based upon this model.