唐紹儀與1911年南北議和

Tang Shao-yi and the Peace Conference of 1911:

As China could not isolate herself from the family of nations since the defeat of the opium war, the interactions between domestic affairs and international politics has become evident. Moreover, when the revolution broke out in October, 1911, treaty rights enjoyed by foreign powers were in steak. Therefore, it has become necessary to manipulate declassified foreign language sources to compare with Chinese ones to look for the truth. As Tang has received education in the U.S. in his early teenage years and has still maintained his traditional cultural root, he was knowledgeable about world affairs and could be more flexible and versatile than any of the Qing officials in making good use of conflicts among powers. Moreover, Tang has been one of Yuan Shih-kai’s long-time proteges since 1884 when he served in Korea. When Yuan was recalled by the Qing government, he appointed Tang to act on his behalf to negotiate with the revolutionaries. Wu Ting-fang, Tang’s counterpart, refused to negotiate unless Tang moves to Shanghai. At the same time, foreign powers led by the British still preferredboth of them to launch their peace talks in Shanghai partly because foreign concessions were there. With British diplomats’assistance, Wu successfully asked Tang to sail down from Hankou and successfully asked foreign powers not to provide financial assistance to the Qing government. Tang arrived at Shanghai on December 17, 1911, and the peace conference took place next day on December 18. As there were still some skirmishesin Shansi and Anhui, in the first conference they asked their troops in these areas to stop fire. In the second conference, they discussed the future form of government. Wu presented two points as the condition: to establish a republican government and to treat the Qing royal family with dignity. While Tang personally agreed on these points, he still needed to wire Peking to ask for decree from the court. Meanwhile, both of them agreed to extend the deadline of ceasing fire to December 31. In the third conference, Tang was authorized to notify Wu that the future form of government will depend upon the decision of the National Assembly, which will be organized by delegates from all over the country and should be held no later than three months. However, since skirmishes still happened in some areas, both of them agreed that the Qing should withdraw their troops no closer than 100 li 里 within five days from 8:00am December30. In the fourth conference, they concentrated on the issue of location to hold National Assembly, the loan from foreign banks, and the treatment of the royal family. In the fifth conference, they denounced the atrocities made by Zhang Xun’s 張勳troops. However, Sun Yat-sen’s return to China and the result of the presidential election made the situation uncertain. Moreover, Tang’s attitude to the republican alarmed both Yuan, who was reluctant to give him full power, and the royal family, who denounced Tang gave too much concession to the republican and betrayed the court. Yuan had no choice but to refuse to acknowledge the agreements signed by Tang and forced him to resign from this post. It may be worth if we could try to figure out the interaction among Yuan, Tang, John Jordan, the British Minister, and Ijuin, the Japanese Minister. Jordan did not stop himself observing the whole situation to protect British treaty rights in China while Japan tried to expand her influence through the promotion of constitutionalism. The Japanese tried to postpone the National Assembly saying that China will split up in pieces while Jordan personally agree to hold the Assembly. Tang wired Yuan to press for the opening of the Assembly, and Yuan cannot miss the time sending his instruction back to Tang. After Yuan wired his instruction to Tang authorizing him to talk with Wu regarding to this issue, Ijuin had no choice but to follow his British colleague’s step.