정부조직 형태의 차이와 로비하의 관세: 서구 국가와 중국을 중심으로

Difference in Government Organization and Tariffs under Lobbying

This study analyzes how the form of government organization in terms of political economy affects the political tariffs caused by lobbying and how large the gap is. Realistically, even if the Chinese economy has become considerably market-oriented since joining the WTO, the level of protection tariffs determined by political processes will be essentially different from that of Western democracies because the political system is different. We find that the amount of political tariffs is relatively higher in a central party-state government organization than in a democratic government organization. This is because, in the latter type of government, the decision-making process of trade policy is more uncertain in terms of transparency and predictability than in the democratic government system. It also is shown that political tariff under the two political systems will be the same when the centralized system becomes a democratic one. This suggests that the more democratic the centralized system becomes, the more the liberalization of trade can be promoted.