
Analysis of Network Neutrality in Two-sided Markets Using Game Theory
게임이론에 의한 양면시장에서의 망중립성 분석
- Hyung Sool Oh(오형술) Jae Ha Lee(이재하)
- 한국산업경영시스템학회
- 산업경영시스템학회지
- 제41권 제3호
- 등재여부 : KCI등재
- 2018.09
- 162 - 169 (8 pages)
Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.
1. 서 론
2. 기존연구 고찰
3 기본 모형
4. 망중립성 정책의 가격 탄력성 비교
5. 결 론