감사품질과 보유현금가치

Audit Quality and the Value of Cash Holdings

본 연구는 감사품질이 기업의 보유현금의 가치에 미치는 영향에 대해 검증하였다. 감사품질이 높은 기업은 경영자의 재량권이 감소하게 되고, 시장에서도 이를 인지하고 있을 가능성이 높기 때문에 경영자가 보유현금을 사용하여 기회주의적 의사결정을 내릴 유인이 적을 것으로 판단하여 보유현금의 가치는 증가할 것으로 예측된다. 또한 고품질의 감사서비스를 제공하는 회계법인은 기업의 내부회계관리제도의 효과적인 운용여부를 검토하는 과정에서 현금과 같은 자산의 횡령 등 기업에서 나타날 수 있는 부정을 적발할 가능성이 높기 때문에 시장에서도 감사품질이 높은 기업이 보유하는 현금의 가치를 더 긍정적으로 평가할 것으로 판단된다. 마지막으로 고품질 감사인은 높은 품질의 회계정보를 통하여 경영자의 의사결정을 외부에서 파악하기 용이하게 하기 때문에 경영자도 이를 의식하여 보유 현금을 비효율적으로 운용할 유인이 감소하며, 시장에서 평가하는 보유현금의 가치는 높아질 것으로 예상된다. 본 연구의 분석결과, 대형회계법인으로부터 감사를 받거나 감사인의 산업전문성이 높은 경우 피감 사기업의 보유현금의 가치는 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 감사품질이 높을수록 경영자와 외부 투자자들 간의 정보비대칭 현상이 감소하고, 경영자가 보유현금을 사적이익 및 효용을 얻기 위해 유용하지 않도록 감독하고 통제할 수 있음을 의미한다. 본 연구는 고품질 감사를 통해 시장에서 기업이 효율적으로 현금을 운용할 것으로 기대하여 보유현금의 가치가 증가하는지 검증하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 나아가 외부감사가 경영자의 기회주의적 의사결정을 통제하는 효과적인 외부지배구조 역할을 담당한다는 실증적 증거를 제시하였다는 측면에서 공헌점이 있다.

This paper examines whether audit quality affects the value of cash holdings. Among the assets held by the corporation, cash can cause agency problems between manager and shareholders in that the cash does not receive much external control compared to other assets and is easy for managers to exert discretions. According to free cash flow theory, a manager in a company with excessive cash may use funds to maximize private utility and make opportunistic investment decisions which could destroy corporate value(Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Lie 2000). Recently, studies on the value of cash holdings have been actively conducted to examine how cash, which can opportunistically used by managers in comparison with other assets, is evaluated in the capital markets. Previous studies related to the value of cash holdings have suggested that firms with a high probability of abusing cash for managerial pursuits of private interest have a lower value of cash holdings. In other words, the value of the cash held by the company and the value of cash level evaluated by external investors are not the same. Therefore, this study aims to verify whether the high audit quality that reduces information asymmetry and agency problem improves the value of the cash holdings of the audited firm by effectively controlling the use of cash for pursuing the manager s private interest. High-quality audit improves the quality of financial information provided to the market and reduces information asymmetry between managers and external investors (DeAngelo 1981). In other words, the financial status and business performance of a company are reported transparently, and more specific and detailed accounting information is provided, so it is easy for investors to understand the efficient use of their cash holdings. In addition, high audit-quality firms can more effectively identify and report problems that arise from internal accounting controls (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Therefore, if audit quality improves, the internal control system is likely to operate effectively, and managers would be less likely to use corporate resources such as cash inefficiently to gain private benefits. Finally, high-quality audits can provide timely disclosure of losses incurred by the company, enabling to effectively monitor cash which could be used for inefficient investments by managers(LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; Francis and Martin 2010). In other words, the external audit performed by the independent auditor mitigates the agency problem caused by the conflicts of interest between managers and external shareholders, thereby acting as an effective external governance. As a result, investors expect companies with high audit quality to more likely to use their cash efficiently, which will result in higher cash value perceived in the market. This study conducted empirical analysis of listed companies from 2001 to 2015. The results of the analysis show that the value of cash holdings was higher for firms audited by Big 4 auditors compared to firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We also find that firms that received audits from auditors with industry expertise have higher value of cash holdings in the market. This suggests that Big 4 audit firms and auditors with industry expertise who provide high quality audits mitigate the information asymmetry and reduce the agency problems that may arise between management and external shareholders due to conflicts of interest, thereby playing a role of preventing the ineffective use of cash in the audited companies. This study provides empirical evidence that investors expect firms with high audit quality to show a more efficient use of cash holdings by managers, resulting in higher market value of cash holdings in those firms. In addition, this paper contributes to understanding the role of external audit as an effective external corporate governance to control managers’ opportunistic decision-making.