Linking the Death Penalty to Trade: Bureaucratic Politics among European Institutions

유럽연합(European Union)은 그 기원이 경제공동체이지만, 오늘날 세계인권의 수호자로서 자리매김 하고 있다. EU는 여러 국제관계를 통해 전 세계적으로 유럽의 인권규범을 전파하고자 노력하고 있으며, 무역도 예외는 아니다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 EU 인권규범과 통상의 연계 가운데 두드러진 이슈로 사형제를 살펴본다. EU는 사형제의 폐지를 인권보호의 차원에서 강력하게 주장하고 있으며, 2005년에는 명시적으로 사형제와 관련된 물품의 유럽 외 수출을 법률로 금한 바 있다. 이슈연계라는 측면에서 본 논문은 사형제와 통상의 연계가 어떻게 발전되어 왔는가를 시기별로 분류하며, 그 원인으로 앨리슨(1971)의 관료정치모형(Model III)을 들어 EU 조직들 간의 정치행태를 이해한다. 이 논문은 유럽의회(European Parliament)가 사형제와 무역을 연결하려는 링커(linker)로서 어떻게 유럽집행위원회(European Commission)를 설득하여 효과적으로 이슈연계를 강화 했는가 살펴봄으로써, 그것이 유럽의회의 EU 내 입지강화의 결과와 원인으로 작용했다는 점을 밝힌다.

For decades, the European Union (EU) has claimed to be a global champion of human rights and made many efforts accordingly both inside and outside the region. For many Europeans, linking human rights issues to internal and international trade has become as natural as linking the environment to trade. The death penalty is also a prominent human rights issue, and the EU calls for its universal abolishment. This study examines why and how the EU has connected the death penalty issue to its trade policy. Building upon the literature on issue linkages, this study categorizes the historical development of the linkage between the death penalty and trade in four different phases: recognition, integration, institutionalization, and expansion. It is argued that the linkage has been strengthened in terms of its “coerciveness” and “directness” over the past few decades. This study uses Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model to explain how and to what extent the internal politics among European institutions, particularly between the European Parliament and the European Commission, have determined the ways in which the two otherwise separate issues have been linked. The European Parliament is the main advocate of such a linkage and has successfully induced the European Commission to promote the abolishment of the death penalty through its commercial power despite its earlier objection. This study claims that the consequence of the death penalty-trade linkage is the empowerment of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the European Commission. In each phase of the linkage development, the European Parliament has made explicit efforts to expand its formal and normative power by voicing strong opinions about the internal and external trade of which the European Commission is in charge. This study concludes that the European Parliament, which stands as an advocate and defender of human rights, has successfully engaged itself in the trade issue area by linking the death penalty to trade and thus increased its influence at the expense of the European Commission.