일본정부의 청일전쟁 개전 정책과 그 성격

The Japanese Government’s Outbreak Policy of the Sino-Japanese War and its Characteristics

This study analyzed the characteristics of the outbreak policy of the Sino-Japanese War that the Japanese government implemented in July 1894. The following summarizes the results. There were various conflicts over the issues of starting the war with the Qing Dynasty within the Japanese government. However, it was not the conflict between the passive outbreak group and the active outbreak group. Rather, it was the conflict between the conditional active outbreak group who claimed that Japan should start the war if the Qing Dynasty reinforces its army to the Joseon Dynasty, and the active outbreak group who asserted that Japan should start the war, irrespective of the reinforcement. The former group of people includes Meiji Tenno(明治天皇), and the latter includes Mutsu Munemitsu(陸奥宗光) and the military. In fact, Ito Hirobumi(伊藤博文) supported Mutsu’s position. There has been no evidence showing if Mutsu, the military, Otori Keisuke(大鳥圭介), and Oshima Yoshimasa(大島義昌) acted arbitrarily on their own authority to convert the passive outbreak to active outbreak policy. It was a “limited arbitrariness” which was acted within the scope of the outbreak policy pushed by Japanese government. “Samae 32(サメ 32號)”(July 19) was an attack order which commands to start the war if the Qing Dynasty reinforces its army. This signified that the conditional active outbreak policy, which came into the scene during the establishment of “the second negotiation refusal(第2次 絶交書)” that Japan informed to the Qing on July 12, was confirmed as an official policy. Meanwhile, a period extending from early June to late July was the process of crystallizing the establishment of exclusive protection rights to the Joseon Dynasty into the purpose of the Sino-Japanese War. Taken together, the recent new theory, which defines the Sino-Japanese War as an accidental one, cannot be supported.