This study aimes to examine the effect of the performance of the local finance operation on local re-election voting behavior. Traditionally there are two opposing theoretical views; the one is that the residents vote positively for the local government head keeping sound and efficient financial operation, and the other is vice versa. The results of analysis show that the local residents react negatively to performance of financial operations, and therefore vote for the incumbent head of local government overexpending local resources to popular pandering projects. This shows that the incumbent local government heads operate loose finances to be reelected in the next election, and therefore results in the financial deterioration of local government as the soft budget constraint. This fact implies that the strict financial discipline must be established, and also the residents must react rationally to decide their voting behavior in selecting their own public servant.
Abstract
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 이론적 고찰
Ⅲ. 연구설계
Ⅳ. 분석결과
Ⅴ. 결론 및 함의
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