階層間 葛藤狀態下에서 次善均衡

Second Best Equilibrium in a Situation of Conflict

The criterion of “no-envy” has been both widely used and rightfully accused of misconception because it does not consider the envy externality. Since its introduction of both Tinbergen and Foley, it has been the object of heated discussion. In 1984, Goldman and Sussankarn showed that the Foley’s criterion is ill-conceived, meaningless and invalid because it fails to model the externality implied by envy. Kolm recently suggested that the classical formulation of no-envy is irrelevant. That is to say, envy, or jealousy, is a consumption externality. Another problem with orthodox economics is that income distribution theory does not adequately explain the results of income inequality. For instance, the conflict between upper and lower classes, dissatisfaction of the middle class, and resulting protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc. The phenomenon and causes of income inequality and the resulting social problem are addressed by this investigation. The interdependent utility function is introduced as a solution to the explanation of social problem. It is assumed that two groups of people, the Rich(R) and the Poor(P) exhibit the same behavior, which a market failure(the reason for consumption externality) occurs in favor of R. In the event of consumption externality, two types of behavior are distinguished : if the utility of an agent j increases when consumption by agent i increases, agent j will be called benevolent. If, on the other hand, the utility of an agent j increases when consumption by agent i decreasses, agent j will be called malevolent. In the beginning of externality, because R is benevolent, transfers to P are voluntarily. In this case, the conflict between the two classes does not occur. Conflict will, however, occur when the limits of the benevolence are reached. The government will then intervene to negotiate a compromise, It is not, however, possible to negotiate a compromise because P wants to receive the transfers and R does not want to give transfers. The most common compromises are direct income tax and the lump-sum transfer. The utility function is assumed to depend on both the ratio of consumptions and available of leisure time. It is further assumed that R and P are reciprocally malevolent : the government will maximize social welfare by an utilitarian approach ; the tax schedule is linear and, the populations of both groups are the same(N). The sets of parameters for the optimal tax rates and transfers(i. e., the elasticities of utility to the consumption ratio) were obtained using the Cobb-Douglas utility function. The second best equilibrium is obtained with the interdependent utility function, when it is compared the neoclassical approach(independent utility function).