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KCI등재 학술저널

미국 냉전정책의 부메랑(boomerang)

- 2006년 북한의 제1차 핵실험의 정치 -

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The aim of this paper is to interpretate on North Korea nuclear programs, especially October 9, 2006 first nuclear test and its implications. North Korea has viewed their nuclear weapons as the key to regime preservation. So, Korean Peninsula denuclearization would bear fruit only if North Korea concludes that eliminating its nuclear program better ensures regime survival. U.S. policy was to achieve the full denuclearization of Korean Peninsular by peaceful multilateral diplomacy, through the Six-Party Talks. But the U.S. has adhered basic principle -Not reward North Korea for coming into compliance with its international obligations- to resolve the North Korea nuclear threat. Given the current armistice situation between them, U.S. attempts to denuclearization is to force North Korea to just surrender. So, the U.S. will fail to achieve their purpose for the dismantlement of North Korea s nuclear program. What does the U.S. Really want? That is probably status quo , not Korean Peninsula denuclearization. The Americans have pursuing preponderance of power in East Asia since the early Cold War, and 2006 now their purpose continued to remain so. In other words, North Korea nuclear threats is a necessary evil for U.S. strategy goals. This is why reason the U.S. would not accept North Korea s demands for ensuring the preservation of regime, ending of the Korean War, normalization between two. To sum it up, North Korea nuclear threats is U.S. policy boomerang from the early Cold War to October 9, 2006. Without changing U.S. approach, North Korea will has more nuclear weapons, and preserve long enough their regime. Are North Korea and the US enemy, or friend?

Ⅰ. 문제제기

Ⅱ. 2006년의 시선들

Ⅲ. 부시행정부의 정책과 한계

Ⅳ. 객관적 조건: 중국과 한국의 입장

Ⅴ. 북한의 태도와 함의

VI. 결론: 냉전체제의 유산

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