The paper examines how the Kennedy Administration managed the military coup occurred on May 16th, 1961 in South Korea by Chung Hee Park and his men, and also analyzed Park’s responses toward American actions. The conclusion of the paper is that Kennedy Administration, which pursued modernization program in the third world, did not have to pressure Park to take actions for democracy which most of third countries did not trust for their nations development. The United States government could only be satisfied as long as Park’s group make sure of anti-communist and stabilization of political situations. On the part of Park, the American policies toward himself was good enough to follow because he could be able to manage political stability and anti-communism. The military coup in South Korea made the Korean problems more simple to handle. Kennedy Administration officials saw the coup as an opportunity to establish a pro-American government in Korea that would willingly follow American policies on unification, economy, and military problems. Right after the coup, the Administration decided to go with the new group represented by Major General Chung Hee Park, who desperately needed American supports to keep his power. In pursuing their policies to the coup leaders, the Administration used American economic and military assistances as levers to lead them in its desired directions. Americans intervened, if necessary, in Korean politics to achieve their goals. But in many cases they refrained from interference in South Korea if the issues had little connections with their basic policy goals. The Kennedy Administration’s Korea policy should be examined in terms of mutual relations because it needed help of the coup leaders to realize their policies; and Chung Hee Park had no choice but to follow American policy toward him, but he was smart enough to make his room in American directions by showing his strong will in some issues which Americans did not make in focus.
Ⅱ. 5ㆍ16 쿠데타를 보는 미국의 시각
Ⅲ. 미국의 영향력 행사와 박정희의 대응