러시아의 동아시아정책과 고종(高宗)의 연해주 망명정부 구상 (1909-1910)

The Second Russo-Japanese Agreement and Korean Emperor Kojong’s plan for exiled government in Primorye(1909-1910)

In June, 1910, former Korean Army Col. Lee Gab notified Russian commercial attache Goyer in Shanghai of the fact that Emperor Kojong, general commander of voluntary troops of Korean Empire had decided to seek asylum in Primorye. This was Emperor Kojong’s final hidden card, well aware of the imminent annexation of Korea by Japan, to deter Japan’s such ambition. Emperor Kojong’s such plan of refuge in Primorye came against the backdrop of his successful disrupting the invasion of Japan, which assassinated Empress Min in the wake of China-Japan War through the royal refuge at the Russian legation in 1896. Emperor Kojong had a plan to seek refuge in Primorye, where some 45,000 Korean lived to lead the anti-Japan independence movement just ahead of Japan’s annexation of Korea. In response, overseas patriotic Korean organizations also tried to deter the annexation through integration of relevant forces. The emperor and patriotic organizations attempted to secure stage for legitimate anti-Japan struggle in Primorye while keenly coping with the rapidly changing international situation. The forces close to the emperor including Lee Sang-seol and Lee Bum-yun who were staying in Primorye to help Emperor Kojong’s bid to seek asylum in Russia attempted to set up cooperative ties with Russian armed forces against Japan to tum the Noryeong Province into a basis for anti-Japan independence movement. The plan pursued by Emperor Kojong later turned into a scheme by Russian army in its bid to use the Koreans for the defense of the Far East area, which was seriously discussed by government authorities including Russian Cabinet head Stolivin. Koreans at that time tried to turn Primorye into the basis for independence movement with the setup of legal national organization in return for cooperating Russia in bids to establish an espionage network, with assistance in the area of education and religion. But the plan faced a strong opposition from Russian officials including Russian Foreign Minister Izvolski, cabinet meeting chief Stolypin and Priamur resident-general Unterberger, and ended in failure. They opposed the plan by the army, saying the idea of utilizing Koreans for the defense of the Far East area would undermine the friendly relations with Japan and cause problems in efforts to prevent the influx of yellow-colored people. Emperor Kojong’s diplomatic and military independence movement failed, while independence activists like Lee Sang-seal and Lee Bum-yun became the main targets of crackdown by the Russian authorities on the contrary. The duplicity of trust and distrust by Russian authorities on Koreans in Primorye is closely related to Russia’s confidence in dealing with the issues of East Asia. In case of proactive pursuit of policies, Russia’s trust on Koreans deepened while distrust spreaded widely in case of passive policies. And such pattern repeated in the history thereafter.