This paper examines the most-favored-nation treatment clause on the BITs concluded by China and examines the attitudes of China on the application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs by period as the scope of arbitration increases. Moreover, this study pointed out the problems that would be exposed if the most-favored-nation treatment clause applies to ISDs and then also suggested solutions. The conclusions of this study are as follows; if the Chinese government strictly restricts the applicable expansion of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the dispute settlement procedure by considering only the position of the capital importing country, it implies a contradiction against the development trend of the arbitration system related to international investment disputes. Of course, in order to protect the rights of Chinese investors investing abroad, expanding the applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs procedure unconditionally may have a negative impact under Chinaʼs dual status of being a capital-importing country and a capital-exporting country. Therefore, China should clearly define the scope of application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause, the completion of the local remedy for the host country in cases of BIT to be concluded in the future or amended, and also clearly define that the most-favored-nation treatment clause should not be retroactively applied into BITs already concluded as an exception of applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment.
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 투자자-국가 분쟁해결제도 에 최혜국대우조항의 확대적용
Ⅲ. 중국 기체결 BITs상 최혜국대우조항의 ISDs에 확대 적용
Ⅳ. 중국의 ISDs에 최혜국대우 조항의 확대 적용과 관련한 대응책
Ⅴ. 결론
References