Violent Entrepreneurs in the Market for Force: A Theoretical and Evolutionary Approach to Explaining the Case of Korea

This article presents an analysis of the market for non-state violence in the Republic of Korea, wherein variance in the phenomenon across time and space is identified and explained. Over time, the strength, relative influence and entrenchment of non-state coercive actors in Korea’s political, social, and economic spheres has varied largely as a function of variations in the state’s capacity for coercion. With their origins in the pre-Colonial period, violent non-state groups developed complex relationships of collaboration and cooperation with governing forces during post-Colonial eras of authoritarianism and democracy. During the chaotic post-WWII and Korean War periods, the influence of these non-state groups was especially pervasive. Yet once the state achieved coercive capacity under the direction of Park Chung Hee their power and influence declined significantly. Under recent industrialization and democratization new niche market opportunities have been successfully exploited by criminal groups. Counter-intuitively these opportunities include the development of cooperative arrangements of violence co-sponsored by befitting but theoretically unlikely bedfellows.