양심에 따른 병역거부와 헌법재판소의 월권(越權) *

A Critical Review of the Constitutional Court Ruling on Conscientious Objection to Military Service in South Korea

최근의 헌법재판소는 국민에 의해 직접 선출되지 않은 사법기관이 가져야 할절제(節制)의 미덕을 포기한 듯이 보인다. 마치 ‘내가 말하는 것이 곧 헌법이다’ 라고 포효(咆哮)하는 듯하다. 선례(先例)도, 논리(論理)도, 사실(事實)도 이 포효를 제어하지 못하는 것으로 보인다. 그 예로 이 글에서 2018년 6월에 헌법재판소가 특정 종교인들의 병역거부를 ‘양심’의 이름으로 승인해 준 결정(‘3차 병역거부 사건’)을 비판적으로 검토한다. 앞선 1, 2차 결정에서 헌법재판소는 양심에 따른 입영거부를 형사처벌하는 조항(‘입영거부 처벌조항’)에 대해 합헌을 선언하였었다. 그런데 이번의 3차 결정에 서는 이 처벌조항에 대해서는 그대로 합헌으로 선언하면서, 그러나 기이하게 병역(兵役; military service)의 종류를 정하는 조항(‘병역종류조항’)에서 대체복무 (civil service)를 규정하지 않은 입법부작위가 입영거부자들의 양심의 자유를 침해한다고 판단하면서 병역종류조항에 대해 헌법불합치결정을 선고하였다. 6인의 헌법재판관이 이를 인정하였으며, 다른 3인의 헌법재판관은 각하 또는 합헌의견을 내었다. 이번 결정에서 결과적으로 기존의 선례가 뒤집어진 셈이다. 그러나 6인의 다수의견이 제시하는 논증을 검토해보면 기존의 선례도 논리도 사실도 모두 무시하고 있는 것으로 분석된다. 그리고 헌법재판소의 이번 헌법불 합치 결정은 자신에게 주어진 헌법재판권의 한계를 넘어 선 것으로 평가된다. 이글에서는 이 점을 4가지 측면에서 논증한다.

The Constitutional Court of South Korea recently seems to have abandoned the virtue of abstinence that the judiciary should have. It seems to roar that ‘the constitution is just what I am saying.’ No precedents, logic, facts seem to control this roar. For example, this article critically examines the third conscientious objection ruling that the Constitutional Court approved the conscientious objection of certain religious people in the name of conscience in June 2018. In the first and second decisions, the Constitutional Court had declared the criminal punishment for conscientious objection to military service to be constitutional. However, in the third round of this decision, the Constitutional Court decided that a legislative omission that did not stipulate any alternative service in the provision of military service type was unconstitutional, while the punishment clause was declared constitutional as it was. The majority opinion of six Justices of the Court recognized the ruling, but three other Justices wrote a dissenting opinion. However, when examining the arguments presented by the majority opinion, it is analyzed that the opinion ignores all the precedent, logic, and facts. And the decision of the Constitutional Court is considered to be beyond the limits of the Constitutional jurisdiction given to it. This article argues these points in four aspects. First, the majority opinion of six Justices made unreasonable arguments in two points to overcome the hurdle of justiciable requirements. First of all, the military service type clause does not meet the constitutional requirement of judging premise. Nonetheless, the majority opinion took the clause as a subject of adjudication. Also, the lack of alternative service in the military service type clause is regarded as a ‘genuine legislative omission’ which cannot be a subject of constitutional review. Nonetheless, the majority opinion declared the omission to be unconstitutional. Secondly, the majority opinion is based on the same method and criteria as the unconstitutionality reasoning for a law restricting freedom, arguing the unconstitutionality of the legislative omission which does not adopt the alternative service system. However, this is a major doctrinal error. It has omitted the argumentation process of confirming the consitutional obligation of legislation. Furthermore, the majority disregarded the fact that the right to conscientious objection was not derived from the interpretation of the Korean Constitution. Thirdly, the majority opinion is based on contingent estimates rather than rigorous findings. Finally, the introduction of alternative service system for conscientious objectors should be made through amendment of the Constitution. It is beyond the scope of its judicial power that the Constitutional Court orders the legislator to introduce an alternative service system.