The purpose of this study is to examine how the characteristics of family firms affect stock price crash risk. Prior studies argued that the opacity of information due to agency problem causes a plunge in stock prices. The governance characteristics of family firms can increase information opacity which leads to crash risk. Therefore, this study verifies whether family firms have a high possibility of stock price crash risk. We use a logistic regression model to test the relationship between family firms and stock price crash risk using listed firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the fiscal years 2011 through 2017. The family firm is defined as the case where the controlling shareholder is the chief executive officer or the registered executive. If the controlling shareholder s share is less than 5%, it is not considered a family business. We found that family firms are more likely to experience a plunge in stock prices. This supports the hypothesis of this study that passive information disclosure behavior and information opacity of family firms increase stock price crash risk.
Ⅱ. 이론적 배경 및 가설의 전개
Ⅳ. 실증분석 결과