순수재산손해에 대한 불법행위책임

Pure Economic Loss in Tort Law: Legal and Economic Analysis

민법은 순수재산손해의 야기에 대한 불법행위책임을 제한하는 별다른 규정을 두고있지 아니하나, 판례와 학설은 이를 일정한 범위에서 제한해왔다. 이러한 현상은 비교법적으로도 어느 정도 관찰되는 바이나, 그 근거가 반드시 분명하지 아니할 뿐 아니라 특히 그 기준이 모호하다는 한계가 있다. 이 글에서는 우리 판례와 학설 및 미국, 영국, 독일, 오스트리아, 스위스, 프랑스 등의 이 문제에 대한 태도를 유형적으로 조감한 뒤 종래의 법(학)적 해명이 여러 점에서 구체적 논리와 기준을 제시하는 데 부족하였음을 보이고, 법경제학적 접근을 통하여 그 빈틈을 메울 수 있을지를 살펴보기로 한다. 이 점에서 순수재산손해는 양의 외부효과와 과잉주의, 효율적 계약위반, 부정경쟁 등으로 설명될 수 있고, 감사인책임 등의 사안유형은 가정적 내지 준(準)계약책임으로 이해할 수 있음을 논증한다.

Pure economic loss means financial damage which does not accompany physical damage to person or property. Although article 750 of the Korean Civil Code, which constitutes the general provision for tortious liability in Korean civil law, discriminates neither intent from negligence nor pure economic loss from other losses in terms of the prerequisites as well as effects of tortious liability, the Korean Supreme Court has adopted more or less cautious approach on the compensability of pure economic loss. The same or similar approach has been observed in other countries, even though the ways to achieve this result are different. Some limit compensability of pure economic loss categorically (U.S. and U.K.), while others acknowledge compensability of loss either when it is derived from the infringement of absolute right or from the intentional commission against good moral (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). There is still other country which allow the compensation of pure economic loss in principle (France). The question is whether and how this limitation of compensability of pure economic loss is justified. In this regard, legal doctrine does not help so much. It explains why pure economic loss should not be compensated at any time, while it does not explain why and when pure economic loss should be compensated. On the contrary, economic analysis provides better explanation why and when pure economic loss should be or not be compensated. The basic intuition is as follows: Pure economic loss is a matter of redistribution and not of social cost, which is the reason why negligent inflict of pure economic loss should not be compensated. It might lead to overcaution. Even intentional or conscious infringement of pure economic loss might be allowed because it is a participation of efficient breach. An intentional participation of inefficient breach, however, should be deterred by imposing liability on the third party participants. An unfair competition with illegal means such as fraud or duress also should be deterred by imposing liability on the competitor even when he or she used these means not on the victim directly but on the counterpart of the victim. Last but not least, liability for pure economic loss of the investors who relied on the inaccurate information can be regarded as quasi-contract liability, which is an imputed contract corresponding to the hypothetical mutual intent between the prospective investors and the auditors or any other information providers. This analysis can be integrated to the legal doctrine of tortious liability and provide more detailed criteria to decide whether to compensate pure economic loss.