Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance

In the early stages of the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance, the U.S. took full responsibility for providing security in the alliance. However, as Korea progressed through economic growth and democratization, asymmetry lessened within the alliance and consequently defense cost-sharing issues emerged. In fact, while South Korea has relatively little inducement for free-riding due to relying heavily on the alliance to counter the threat from North Korea, the easing of asymmetry has complicated the cost-benefit calculation for the alliance and has replaced the traditional security-autonomy tradeoff. In particular, problems may arise due to an increased risk of entrapment due to differences in threat perception between the two countries. In this regard, defense cost-sharing is a critical issue in maintaining the alliance, not just in terms of sharing the cost of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea, but in the process of realigning and renewing the effectiveness of the alliance.