A Realist Response to the (Alleged) Explanatory Inadequacy of Moral Facts: A Sketchy

이 논문은 도덕 사실 반대 논증 중 하나를 명확하게 하고, 이에 대해 도덕 실재론자가 제시할 수 있는 답변에 대한 궁리이다. 이 반대 논증에 따르자면, 도덕 사실이 설사 실재하더라도 이는 도무지 아무 것도 설명할 수 없다. 이 주장은 3가지로 이해되며 이 논문은 우선 그 3가지에 대한 분석을 제시한다. 다음으로 설명 부적절 논증에 대한 3가지 이해 각각에 대해 도덕 실재론자가 제시할 수 있는 답변에 대해 고찰하고자 한다.

I shall first make clear what the antirealist argument is in this paper. I shall then sketchy a realist response to the argument from the EI thesis by making explicit the requirements for ontologically respectable moral explanations, viz. appeals to putative moral facts. First, an explication of the antirealist argument is given. There are no moral facts because (1) appeals to them provide no understanding about the world, or (2) they provide comparatively less understanding than appeals to nonmoral facts do, or (3) they are capable of providing understanding because the explanatory power is derived entirely from subvening nonmoral facts. Second, moral realist responses to the antirealist argument are sketched. No-understanding version of it is argued to be false. Explanatory reductionism is, while it is more plausible than no-understanding version, argued to be as-of-yet just a promissory note. Furthermore moral explanations that satisfy strictures of scientific explanations must appease the explanatory reductionist worries. The comparative explanatory advantage version of the argument nonetheless survives the two critical responses. A common ground between moral realists and antirealists is thus called for, contrastive explanation to further evaluate the merit of the version of the antirealist argument.