기업지배구조 개혁의 상반된 두 논리

Competing Rationales for Corporate Governance Reform: Capital Markets vs. Coordinated Innovation in France, 1998~2005

This paper analyzes why converging and diverging forces coexist in corporate governance reform of an economy and what the result is. Using a panel data on CAC40 firms in France(1998~2005), we show that the competing rationale interacts in the context of financial efficiency and coordinated innovation system. The mechanism of the shareholder model is required for efficient resource acquirement from capital markets. The change of auditing rule contributes to the increased market capitalization of CAC40 firms. However, the rationale for the stakeholder model still continues under coordinated innovation system. The characteristic French mode of control such as state ownership and shareholders’ agreement has positive effects on innovation activities such as R&D intensity and patent intensity. This conflicting but compatible phenomenon explains the selective path-dependent trajectory of corporate governance reform.