Purpose - Against the backdrop of the recent intense political conflict in Korea s political circles, it is to reveal from an economic point of view the hidden aspects behind the hostile conflict between the two political forces. Design/methodology/approach - This paper is not a normative study to find a solution to political conflict, but a positive study to reveal the mechanism of reciprocity that exists between the two parties of conflict in real politics. Therefore, the analysis is based on game theory methodology. Findings - It is shown that the ruling party should choose a level of preemptive response that is neither insufficient nor excessive if it aims to avoid radical anti-government struggles by opposition parties. We also find that even if the chances of success of the opposition s radical offensive struggle are low, the use of that strategy is not necessarily reduced. In addition, we have obtained comparative static results that do not deviate much from our intuition. What s interesting is that unlike our intuition that the choice of the method will be indifferent if the marginal effects of radical and normal methods of struggle are the same, the opposition party rather chooses the normal method of struggle more often. Research implications or Originality - In forming the analytical model, it reflected the support of the general public following the opposition s struggle against the ruling party in order to capture real politics well in the conflict between the two opposing parties.
Ⅱ. 기본모형의 구성
Ⅲ. 간접효과와 균형