유엔군의 해상봉쇄·도서점령과 NLL

U.N. Forces’ Maritime Blockades, Taking Control of Islands, and the Issue of NLL

In this article, the reason for all the conflicts over the NLL on the West Sea of the Korean peninsula, of which the frequency is considerably higher than in the East Sea, is considered to have been caused by a ‘rule of exception’ which was inserted in the Cease-fire Armistice concerning certain ‘five Islands’ on the West Sea. So, examined in this article are historical scenes in which the U.N. forces and South Korean troops blockaded the sea and seized control over the islands. In the meantime, naval forces operations, as well as the issue of island control which was discussed at the armistice negotiation table, and most importantly, how all these incidents led to the NLL after the war, is examined here as well. Right after the Korean war broke out, the U.S. Naval force joined the war and engaged in maritime blockades, naval bombardments, and landing operations. The Korean Naval force was placed under the authority of the U.S. Far-East Naval Headquarters, and were engaged in blockades and defense operations too. The West sea islands seized by the Korean Navy were used as operational bases for the commando units and anti-espionage units of the Korean and U.N. forces. The Baek’ryeong-do island in particular, which had Camp William Able, was an essential base for commando and anti-espionage units. When the issue of island control was brought up at the negotiation table on November 27th of 1951, U.S. agreed to withdraw its troops from islands above the extension line of the military demarcation line, yet unlike in the East Sea, the U.S. wished to continue controlling the five islands including Baek’ryeong-do in the West sea, with a ‘Rule of Exception.’ These five islands of the West sea belonged to the North side of the military demarcation line, but were also beneath the 38th Parallel and were therefore under control of the U.N. forces. Two months later, the U.S. formed a Western Islands Defense Post and established a command center on the Baek’ryeong-do island commanded by a marine officer. Bases were also established on the Yeon’pyeong-do and Cha-do islands. This was a definitive move on the U.S.’s part which enabled all the five islands to go under U.N. control. After a bit of discussion, but only after a week, the Communist army agreed to the terms suggested by the U.N. forces concerning the five islands on the West sea. The Communist army was fully aware of the strategic importance of the West sea’s five islands, but did not have enough military power to take control of them. So, they wanted to attach a special definition of the West sea’s five islands to the Armistice, in order to confirm the fact that these islands were never to be connected and act as a line. This was to prevent such line from connecting all five islands and serving as a blockade line or a borderline on sea. Such intention is clearly specified in the armistice. Yet after the armistice was signed, the Korean troops(the U.N. forces) linked the five islands in the West sea, and turned it into an NLL which served as a middle line between South Korea and North Korean shores. Such unilateral move was not warranted by the armistice. And later the NLL on the West line became a fundamental reason for all the clashes on West sea’s NLL.