청일전쟁기 일본군의 조선병참부

People of Joseon and War Commissaries ofthe Japanese Army during the Sino-Japanese War : Focused on Hwanghae and Pyeongan Regions

During the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan took the control of the Battle of Pyeongyang September 14, 1894, Japan launched immediate actions to send military supplies to China through the River Daedong in Hwanghae Province of Joseon. As the Sino-Japanese War was expanded to the mainland China, the Japanese Second Army was dispatched directly to China while the First Army was sent to Incheon-Pyeongyang-Euiju-China lines. Since Hwanghae and Pyeongan Provinces of Joseon were located near China, they played a significant role as a commissary for the Japanese Army during the war. Hence, the above-mentioned Hwanghae and Pyeongan would be considered as regions to most clearly represent the relations between the Japanese army commissaries and the people of Joseon. Japan’s attempt to gradually turn Joseon into a big war commissary began illegitimately, and it eventually forcefully led Joseon into a whirl of war in which Joseon didn’t find much cause to join. An exemplary case can be found in the process of handling an official document of Joseon government concerning the enlistment of its labor forces for the commissary. July 24, 1894, which was a day after the Japanese troops took control of Gyeongbok Palace, the commissary commander of Incheon region Takenochi Sesake met Kim Ga-jin and Ahn Kyung-soo of the Joseon government and requested to send Joseon officials to the Japan’s commissaries and have them collaborate with the Japanese forces to enlist Joseon’s men and horses for the was. This initial attempt of Japan’s enforcement against the Joseon government was progressed into the Joseon-Japan Offensive and Defensive Alliance (조일공수동맹) of August 26 the same year. The enlistment of Joseon’s men and horses in accordance with the 관문통달 of the Joseon government and the Joseon-Japan Offense and Defense Alliance, which were forcefully concluded by Japan, became systemized and benefited the Japanese troops during the war. However, the enlisted Joseon people did not comply with requests that didn’t guarantee secured wages, required extensive travels or assigned on traditional holidays. Gradually, this forcefully concluded enlistment policy generated social complications in Joseon such as issues concerning wages for those enlisted and currency related complications, etc. In order to secure sufficient Joseon currency, the Japanese government sent their own merchants to Joseon and tried to circulate the Japanese currency within it, and these displacements of Japanese men forces and currency created a foundation for Japan’s colonization of Joseon. In the meantime, the wage decrease for the enlisted men of Joseon seemingly became one of thereasons for frequently witnessed thefts on military supplies and Japanese currency. The Japanese army took a firm stance to deal with the above issues by sentencing heavy punishments including death penalties in order to avoid its possibly negative impacts on the Sino-Japanese War. At the same time, the peasant armies in Hwanghae and Pyeonganregions confronted the Japanese forces in a more proactive and systematic way, and the according subjugation operation of the Japanese forces against the peasant armies was intensified. As shown above, Hwanghae and Pyeongan regions played roles as the commissaries of the Japanese army during the Sino-Japanese War, and this implies the Japan’s enlistment of Joseon men and horses and the Japan’s subjugation against the men of Joseon did not take place separated, but occurred within a bigger frame of Japan’s military strategies carved for the Sino-Japanese War. Hence, the suggested two issues should not be viewed in a smaller frame of the relations only between Joseon and Japan, but need to be perceived within a broader frame of Sino-Japan War frame, i.e., a trilateral relation among Joseon, China and Japan during the war period.