6·25전쟁시 중국군의 지구전 전략과 군사개혁

The Chinese Forces’ strategy during the Korean War

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze The Chinese Forces’ strategy during the Korean War. In mid-October 1950, when Kim Il Sung and the North Korean People’s Army were fleeing to North P’yongan and Hamgyong after falling P’yongyang to the UN forces, Communist Chnia organized ‘a volunteer army’ from its elite regular army units and enterd the war to rescue the Kim Il Sung regime and communize the entire Korean Penisula by driving out the UN forces. After crossing the Yalu, the Chinese Forces established a Combined Headquarters, North Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers. Exercising Operation control over the North Korean People’s Army, the CCF carried out an offensive with the so-called ‘human wave’ or ‘sea of men’ as the main tactic. Although the Chinese Forces carried out a total of five offensives from their entry into the war in late October 1950 to late May 1951, and at one time managed to occupy Seoul and advance to the 37th Parallel, they failed to achieve their initial objective of driving out the UN forces. Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese leadership felt that “although a victory was gained in the five campaigns, the difficult situation faced by friendly forces due to the disparties in equipment has not changed”. They decided to make a transition to a ‘war of attrition’ and accept the US proposal for armistice, determining policy that “friendly forces prepares for a long war and resolve the Korean problem by annihilating US forces”. In the end, The chinese forces, Peng Teh Huai thus adopted a new guideline for the conduct of the war in mid-June, deciding to end the war through a war of attrition and peace negotiations. In the area of military operations, the leadership called for a war of attrition and active defence.