Purpose - This paper examines the welfare effects of strategic R&D policies among technologically asymmetric countries focusing on the conditions for the cooperative R&D policy coordination. Design/Methodology/Approach - The analysis is based on a model assuming two firms supported by their governments’ R&D subsidies that compete in the third country market in Cournot fashion. Findings - We demonstrate that non-cooperative R&D policy competition deteriorates the global welfare when the competing goods are strategic substitutes, while the R&D competition might improve welfare when the products are strategic complement. Since the country with a higher technology level has an incentive to deviate to non-cooperative R&D policies when the products are strategic substitutes and the technological gap is higher than the threshold level, the introduction of international R&D policy coordination mechanism is required to improve the welfare with the cooperative R&D policies sustained. Research Implications - This study attempted to analyze the optimal R&D support policy considering a broader market form and competitive form, assuming both the substitutability and completeness of the goods and the level of the technology gap as continuous variables.
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 기본모형
Ⅲ. 비협조적인 R&D 지원정책체제의 균형분석
Ⅳ. 협조적인 R&D 정책협력의 사회후생효과 및 정책협조 지속가능조건분석
Ⅴ. 정책적 시사점 및 결론
References
(0)
(0)