Purpose - This paper analyzes the possibility of a strategic behavior of the importing country which attempt to facilitate the cumulative provision of rule of origin to the member countries of FTA equally or discriminately. Design/Methodology/Approach - For this purpose, we introduced two-stages game which described the importing country’s strategic behavior, and by using backward induction approach, we attempt to solve the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). Findings - As a result of the study, it was found that the multilateral cumulation system which importing country facilitate the cumulation provision to the member countries of FTA equally will help structuring the global value chain in intra-FTA members and make the international production system more efficient. However, if the importing country’s government seek to utilize the cumulation provision of FTA rule of origin strategically, none of them will have the incentive to voluntarily facilitate the multilateral accumulating system to all the exporting countries because they suffer a decrease in social welfare such as a decrease in tariff revenue. Research Implications - These findings suggest that in order to applying multilateral cumulation system to all of the FTA member countries, it is necessary to develop a reasonable incentives that could attract the importing country to the multilateral cumulation system.
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 선행연구 및 이론적 배경
Ⅲ. 모형
Ⅳ. 결론 및 정책적 제언
References
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