북한의 6자회담 협상전략·전술

평가와 전망

본 논문의 연구목적은 그 동안 6자회담의 진행과정을 통해 북한이 보여준 협상전략·전술을 평가하여 향후 그 전략·전술을 전망하는 데에 두고 있다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같이 요약·정리된다. 첫째, 이론적 배경으로서 북한의 협상에 관한 전략(strategy)과 전술(tactics), 협상전략·전술의 유형 등이 위기외교전략, 벼랑끝전략, 지렛대의 창출전략 차원에서 고찰되었다. 둘째, 그 이론적 배경을 토대로 6자회담에서 표출된 쟁점사안에 대한 북한의 협상전략·전술이 어떻게 나타났는가를 제1차 6자회담~제6차 6자회담 3단계회의에 이르기까지 분석되었다. 셋째, 북한의 협상전략·전술에 대한 평가와 향후 변화전망에서는 우선, 6자회담에서는 북한의 모든 협상전략·전술이 동원되어 집중되었고, 북한이 기본적으로 벼랑끝외교전략의 협상전략·전술을 꾸준히 구사해왔으며, 북한의 협상전략·전술은 더욱 다양해지고 체계화되고 있다는 특징으로 나타나고 있다고 평가되었다. 그리고 현재 북한은 정권·체제생존의 확보차원에서 핵보유전략을 고수하고 있기 때문에 자신의 정권·체제생존이 확보될 때까지 핵보유전략에 터잡은 협상전략·전술을 갖고 6자회담에 나올 것이라고 전망되었다. 그 결과 결론적으로 향후 북한의 완전한 핵폐기·핵포기 목표점도 장기적 관점에서 접근·전망해야 할 것이라고 보았다.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze North Korea’s negotiation strategies and tactics in the Six-party Talks for settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue, and based on such analysis, to examine its special appraisal, and in future prospect on negotiating strategies and tactics of North Korea. The result of this article is as below. During the last five years North Korea had sat down with South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia for dialogue to find ways to disable its nuclear facilities in exchange for economic aid and political concessions. The Talks have been stalled due to disagreement between American and North Korean officials over how to verify the North’s nuclear declaration and its nuclear dismantlement. But this paper assert that due to Kim Jong-il regime’s uncompromising negotiation strategies and tactics in the Six-party Talks, North Korea resumed operation of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in defiance of the 1994 Framework Agreement and extracted enough plutonium for at least four more nuclear weapons in addition to two or three in its arsenal and tested a nuclear weapon. When Pyongyang threatened to resume plutonium production in August in protest against the Bush administration’s demand for a verification process that included intrusive inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. The Kim Jong-il regime’s officials, who emphasize direct talks and compromise with Washington, overlook the fact that North Korea violated the 1994 Geneva Agreement, the very cause of the current crisis, and try to gloss over the issue with a negotiated settlement, even by giving concessions whenever the North resorts to brinkmanship tactics. Such attitudes by the officials have led to a misconception among the people that giving concessions to the North when it resorts to brinkmanship is an engagement policy, as having a dialogue, whereas refusing to accept the North’s demands is a confrontational hard-line policy, refusing dialogue. Consequently, what is even worse is that North Koreans use such negotiation strategies and tactics in the Six-party to their advantage. It certainly makes them feel comfortable to know that they will win whenever they resort to brinkmanship. But the election of Barack Obama as the president of the United States last November 14, 2008 will certainly bring change to the nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea.