Explaining and Theorizing Development: Historical Structures and Strategic Preferences in the Comparative Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa

In explaining the determinants and variations of development, both rational choice and historical institutionalism share an assumption about the prominent role of the state which constrains actors perceptions and choices. However, historical institutionalist approach is more successful in providing the state as an active and primary role and in focusing on the diversity of institutional arrangements rooted in its own historical structures and situations. In most developing countries, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, the incumbent regimes do not allow space for societal actors in order to keep their invested interests. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose the role of the state as an initial condition in causal explanation of power asymmetries and settings. As a minimal condition for development, the state should possess at least quasi-pluralist structures where societal actors can have room for maneuver. As a maximum condition, the state should hold responsive autonomy through which the state facilitates a mutual interaction between the state and society in promoting development. Given these conditions, political reform or institutional transformation should be preceded or at least accompanied with economic reform. Otherwise, it is quite unlikely that the prospects of structural adjustment reform in the region show greater possibilities to succeed.