This research assesses the relative strength of negative transboundary externality, the scientific consensus of epistemic communities, and the administration’s party identification in explaining the US position toward the international environmental cooperation to regulate transboundary air pollution. Results show that (1) the United States tends to be friendly toward international cooperation to regulate transboundary air pollutants which it exports more than imports, and vice versa; (2) it tends to be active toward international cooperation, when epistemic communities have a strong scientific consensus upon the causal paths of certain transboundary air pollutants; (3) the party identification of its administration turns out to be weakest at explaining the US policy position toward international environmental cooperation to control transboundary air pollution.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. National Interests and Negative Externality in Environmental Cooperation
Ⅲ. US Position upon Transboundary Air Pollution Protocols
Ⅳ. Conclusion
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