Analysis and Evaluation on Clinton Administration’s Engagement Policy toward North Korea

The purpose of this paper is to study the Clinton administration’s engagement policy toward North Korea. For that, it attempts to evaluate and analyze engagement policy and inducing North Korea to soft landing. The Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea’s change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self-imposed isolation. Assuming these, the Administration’s engagement policy toward DPRK is evaluated by and large in considering disagreement of the U.S. global strategy, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance.